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I. INTRODUCTION
In Grutter v Bollinger, the United States Supreme Court dealt an
important blow to opponents of affirmative action.' In a surprising
move, the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School's
affirmative action program and concluded that diversity is a
compelling interest.2
The Court's decision is particularly noteworthy in two respects.
First, the Court rejected the argument that the Constitution is
colorblind and that classifications based upon race, except in
extremely narrow circumstances, are per se unconstitutional.' This
move is significant as enshrining colorblindness as a constitutional
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. This is an
annotated version of remarks delivered at from Brown to Grutter. Affirmative Action and
Higher Education in the South. I am grateful to my colleague Brian Bix for comments on an
earlier draft.
1. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
2. Id at 2339-40, 2347.
3. Id at 2338-39.
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principle was a central aim of the plaintiff and the advocacy groups
that supported her. Though the lawsuit was filed ostensibly on behalf
of Barbara Grutter, an unsuccessful applicant for admission to the
University of Michigan Law School,4 the suit was in fact an attempt by
opponents of affirmative action and race consciousness to inscribe
their views into constitutional doctrine.
Second and relatedly, the Court explicitly recognized that racial
categorizations are not all morally equivalent.5 With the possible
exception of Easely v Cromartie,6 the Court had never sustained a
racial classification against an equal protection challenge and the
application of strict scrutiny.7 By sustaining the classification at issue,
the Court revived the benign/malign racial classification distinction
that it had interred in City ofRichmond v JA. Croson Co.8
In this Essay, I examine the decision from the vantage point of the
colorblindness principle. I use classical liberalism as a heuristic for
exploring whether the colorblindness argument is necessarily a moral
imperative. I argue that the Court adopted the right approach in
Grutterand justly rejected the allure of the colorblindness principle.
II. COLORBLINDNESS, INDIVIDUALISM, AND EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY
Classical liberalism consists of four major propositions. First, the
individual is the only legitimate moral and political entity.' Relatedly,
the individual is free, autonomous, and capable of independently
choosing her ends.'" Second, a separation exists between what is
public and what is private." Most importantly for liberal theory, state
power can only be concerned with matters that are civil in nature; in all
other matters the individual will is sovereign. Third, the state (and
society) cannot interfere with the individual's pursuit of her ends
4. Id at 2332-33.
5. Id. at 2338.
6. 532 U.S. 234,237 (2001).
7. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARV. L. REv. 494, 501 (2003).
8. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
9. This proposition is true both of Kantian-based liberalism and Millian-based
liberalism. Michael J. Sandel, Introduction to LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 4 (Michael J.
Sandel ed., 1984) ("[R]ights-based liberalism begins with the claim that we are separate,
individual persons, each with our own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, and seeks
a framework of fights that will enable us to realize our capacity as free moral agents,
consistent with a similar liberty for others.").
10. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Stefan Collini ed., 1995).
11. See genemlly JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 26 (James H.
Tully ed., 1983); Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS,
supm note 9, at 15, 15-17.
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except to prevent harm to others. 2 Fourth, liberalism presupposes an
individual capable of consent.
Classical liberalism has had a great effect on American history
and constitutional law." This effect is no less present in the
constitutional debate that surrounds the practice of affirmative action.
Of the four foundational principles of liberalism noted above,
affirmative action jurisprudence draws upon three of them quite
explicitly: (a) individualism, (b) the harm principle, and (c) the public
and private distinction. The notion of consent is virtually invisible in
affirmative action jurisprudence. To the extent that it plays a role, its
presence is more or less implicitly assumed as a background principle.
Commentators on both the left and the right blame liberalism for
the demise or persistence of affirmative action, respectively.'" To
some, affirmative action policies are "in tension with the liberal ideals
of our society, they may encourage divisive identity politics, and they
may stigmatize and foster antagonism toward members of the groups
they are intended to benefit."'5 To others, "liberal democratic theory"
is to blame for the "backlash against affirmative action."'6 To these
critics, liberalism's focus on individualism necessitates a different
framework for properly appreciating the moral worthiness of
affirmative action programs.
Opponents of affirmative action maintain that any consideration
of race in determining how burdens and benefits are to be distributed
is unconstitutional. This is obviously the colorblind argument. This
argument has found a sympathetic ear from some Justices on the
United States Supreme Court. In particular, Justices Thomas and
12. MILL, supra note 10, at 13.
13. JAMES C. FOSTER & MARY C. SEGERS, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: LIBERALISM,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND SOCLA L CHANGE IN AMERICA 11 (1983) ("The dominant political
ideology in the United States is liberalism."); Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal
Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108 YALE L.J. 967, 973 (1999).
14. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 4-5, 231-43 (1996) (discussing the adverse affects of
affirmative action); DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE
POLITICS OF MEANING (1993); RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 102-08, 202-04
(1995) (discussing affirmative action in law schools); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OF JUSTICE 373-74, 402-07 (1998) (discussing affirmative action).
15. Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom 9, 47 STAN. L. REV.
855, 858 (1995).
16. Richard Abel, Big Lies and Small Steps: A Critique of Deborah Rhode s Too
Much Law, Too Little Justice: Too Much Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1019, 1024 (1998); Scott Cummings, Affirmative Action and the Rhetoric of
Indvidual RIghts: Reclaiming Liberalism as a "Color-Conscious" Theory, 13 HARv.
BLACKLETTERL.J. 183, 183 (1997).
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Scalia have expressed their view that, except in extremely rare
circumstances, race is an impressible basis for state action. 7
In Grutter, Justice Thomas provided two analytically related
arguments to support his contention that the Constitution must be
colorblind.'8 First, Justice Thomas maintained that the Constitution
protects individuals, and all individuals equally, irrespective of color.9
As he stated in Grutter, "Purchased at the price of immeasurable
human suffering, the equal protection principle reflects our Nation's
understanding that [racial] classifications ultimately have a destructive
impact on the individual and our society.'2" Justice Thomas's position
in Grutter paralleled those of Justice Powell in Regents of the
University of Caifomi v Bakke, who maintained that "it is the
individual who is entitled to judicial protection against classifications
based upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions
impinge upon personal rights."' Similarly, Justice O'Connor stated in
Croson that citizens possess the "'personal rights' to be treated with
equal dignity and respect."2
The problem of race-based decision making, from this
perspective, is that it undermines or implicates those personal rights. 3
As a consequence, "racial classifications are per se harmful and ...
almost no amount of benefit in the eye of the beholder can justify such
classifications.'
Justice Thomas's second point is that neither the judiciary nor the
state are capable of distinguishing between racial classifications that
are beneficial-in their application-to citizens of color and racial
classifications that are harmful to citizens of color.5 Indeed, the bulk
17. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2365 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens." (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
18. Id. at 2352, 2361 (Thomas J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19. Id at 2352 (Thomas J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
20. Id. (Thomas J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)); see also id (Thomas J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (stating that "every time the government places citizens on racial
registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all").
21. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978); see also City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (stating that the "rights created by the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual"
(internal quotations omitted)).
22. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
23. Id. at 493-94.
24. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2361 (Thomas J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
25. Id (Thomas J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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of Justice Thomas's dissent is directed at the Law School's contention
that affirmative action benefits citizens of color, particularly African-
Americans.26 Justice Thomas maintained that "what lies beneath the
Court's decision ... are the benighted notions that one can tell when
racial discrimination benefits (rather than hurts) minority groups."27
He then goes on to argue that affirmative action in admissions does not
benefit students of color.
28
In Bakke, Justice Powell articulated similar concerns. He stated:
"[T]here are serious problems of justice connected with the idea of
preference itself. '2  These serious problems of justice include the
difficulty of ascertaining whether "a so-called preference is in fact
benign."
30
In justifying its refusal to distinguish between invidious and
benign racial classifications, the Court has explicitly looked to classic
liberal theory, and the maxim that the "Constitution protect[s] persons,
not groups."3' As Justice Powell stated in Bakke, "[I]t is the individual
who is entitled to judicial protection against classifications based upon
his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions impinge
upon personal rights."32 Similarly, Justice O'Connor stated in Croson
that citizens possess the "personal right" "to be treated with equal
dignity and respect."3 The problem of race-based decision making,
from this perspective, is that it implicates, and ultimately undermines,
those personal rights. This position raises an initial inquiry about the
reasons for recognizing political rights as belonging only to the
individual and not also to groups. Justice Powell offers two
26. Id. at 2353-63 (Thomas J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27. Id at 2361 (Thomas J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
28. See id. at 2361-63 (Thomas J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978).
30. Id
31. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (stating that "the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect persons, not groups. It follows from that
principle that all governmental action based on race-a group classification long recognized
as 'in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited'-should be subjected to
detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has
not been infringed. These ideas have long been central to this Court's understanding of equal
protection, and holding 'benign' state and federal racial classifications to different standards
does not square with them").
32. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271; see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 493 (1989) (stating that "the rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment are, by its, terms, guaranteed to the individual").
33. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
34. The harms that are implicated by race-conscious decision making are race-
conscious actions motivated by notions of racial inferiority, racial politics, and stigmatic
harms. Id. at 493-94.
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justifications for guaranteeing this political right-the right not to be
subjected to a racial classification-to individuals and not to groups.
He is concerned with a line-drawing problem and a problem of judicial
competence.
Justice Powell's first concern is that if racial groups are granted
political rights there "is no principled basis for deciding which groups
would merit 'heightened judicial solicitude' and which groups would
not."35 For Justice Powell, all groups, with the possible exception of
"white Anglo-Saxon Protestants,"36 have an arguable claim to
constitutional protection. This is because "the United States has
become a Nation of minorities," each of which has "had to struggle-
and to some extent struggles still-to overcome the prejudices not a
monolithic majority, but of a 'majority' composed of a various
minority groups."7 Given that we are in fact a nation of minorities, as
Madison intimated and the pluralists made clearer some time ago, 8
how do we determine which groups deserve constitutional protection?
On its face, this is not truly a constitutional question but a
question of political power. In other words, the issue is not one of
discrimination against groups and the discovery of traits that may
enable a given group to claim "discrete and insular" status, but instead
it is one of political influence and constitutional norms. What does
one do with groups that are at the losing end of the political bazaar?
For, larger debates aside, affirmative action litigation is exactly that:
the presentation of claims by those affected negatively by the state
action at issue. Bakke, Fullilove, Adarana and Grutter are all similar
in this respect; the claim is not of direct discrimination, but of political
loss, perhaps indifference. Seen this way, and taking Justice Powell's
position seriously, one possible solution to his query is to defer to the
judgment of the other political branches.
This move raises the issue of institutional epistemic authority.
Who should we believe with respect to providing justifications for
taking race into account? Is credibility institution-dependent? One
possibility is that certain justifications for race-based state decision
making are off limits irrespective of the institution sponsoring the
justification. Another possibility is to defer to a particular institution
irrespective of the justification being provided. The option that the
Court has opted for is a mixture of both of these possibilities:
35. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 292.
38. See, e.g., ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE To DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956).
2014 [Vol. 78:2009
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sometimes a justification is discounted irrespective of the sponsoring
institution; in other cases credibility is institution-dependent.
In this respect, affirmative action jurisprudence follows the
example of classical liberalism, in particular a Lockean understanding
of epistemic authority. For Locke, justification is always institution-
dependent." In different spheres, different social rules apply or
different reasons count. Don Herzog explains: "[A] world of fractured
authority is an orderly world."' More specifically, he proceeds:
Multiple roles, multiple institutions, perfectly distinct, and infinitely
different from each other: they add up not to chaos, but to order. No
one is in control, but everything has its own sphere. Place and degree
fade, the one neat pyramid dissolves; instead individuals occupy many
roles, and they may well find themselves in charge in some settings,
anonymous and weak in others. This account of social order is the
crucial insight of liberalism, the counterintuitive solution to decades of
religious and political conflict.4'
This account of the tradition pays close attention to social roles,
spheres of authority, and institutional responsibilities. The ultimate
goal is social order amidst a chaotic world. Liberalism achieves this
order by splintering authority from its medieval, unified source and
dispersing it among varied institutions. Once these institutions are in
place, substantive disagreements on the policies at issue take a back
seat to the view that proper political channels must be left to carry out
their predetermined duties.
Following in the footsteps of liberalism, affirmative action
jurisprudence attempts to delineate the areas in which certain race-
based justifications are off-limits and attempts to promulgate
defensible principles pursuant to which certain articulating institutions
may permissibly employ constitutionally legitimate race-based
justifications. We know, of course, that since Marbury v Madison, the
Court has abrogated to itself the power (or authority) 2 to determine the
extent of the exercise of state action upon the individual and
concomitantly the power/authority to determine the limits of individual
autonomy. Since Marbuty, the issue has been whether, and under what
circumstances, other branches are entitled to share in that
determination.
39. SeeLOCKE, supm note 11.
40. DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 169 (1989).
41. Id. at 169-70.
42. Of course, liberalism differentiates between power and authority. The ambiguity
here is intended to reflect the contested nature of the Court's move in Marbur.
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Fulliove v Klutznick provides an apt example of epistemic
authority in affirmative action jurisprudence. In Fullilove, the
plaintiffs challenged a federal statute mandating that ten percent of
federal funds granted for local public works projects be used by the
state or local grantee to procure services or supplies from businesses
owned and controlled by members of the statutorily defined minority
groups." The plaintiffs filed suit seeking an injunction of the set-aside
provision.45
A central issue raised by Fullilove is whether and to what extent
the Court should defer to Congress's determination that certain racial
groups were entitled to special treatment because they were subjected
to either the present or lingering effects of societal discrimination.
Recall that in Bakke Justice Powell argued that state universities were
not competent to make those determinations.46 In Justice Powell's
view, state institutions-in the form of public educational
institutions-cannot make those determinations because they cannot
be trusted to appropriately balance the equities.47 Given that the choice
is between the courts and the state, if we can not trust the state, then,
by default, the courts must make these decisions. In Fullilove the
question was whether Congress possessed the "authority and
capability" to decide what racial groups to prefer and for what reasons.
The plurality answered in the affirmative. Then-Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the plurality stated:
43. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
44. Id. at 453. The preferred groups were included but were not limited to "black
Americans, American Indians, Spanish-Americans, oriental Americans, Eskimos, and
Aleuts." Id. at 464.
45. Id at 455.
46. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309-10:
Petitioner does not purport to have made, and is in no position to make, such
findings. Its broad mission is education, not the formulation of any legislative
policy or the adjudication of particular claims of illegality ... [I]solated segments
of our vast governmental structures are not competent to make those decisions, at
least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined criteria.
Before relying upon these sorts of findings in establishing a racial classification, a
governmental body must have the authority and capability to establish, in the
record, that the classification is responsive to identified discrimination.
47. Id at 307-08. It cannot be Justice Powell's decision that democratically elected
regents of state universities are incapable of determining that their institutions underserve a
certain percentage of their state's population, a situation which they take upon themselves to
remedy. Justice Powell's concern must be that without access to judicial review "the legal
rights of victims" will not be vindicated. Id; see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S.
267, 275-76 (1986)
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A program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial
context, calls for close examination; yet we are bound to approach our
task with approach our task with appropriate deference to the Congress,
a co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with the power to
"provide for the ... general Welfare of the United States" and "to
enforce, by appropriate legislation,' the equal protection guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Here we pass, not on a choice made by a single judge or a school
board, but on a considered decision of the Congress and the President.48
The fact that Congress had determined that certain racial groups were
victims of discrimination in the contracting industry was sufficient for
the Court. The Court was persuaded that, because Congress was a
national legislature, it, and it alone, was capable and authorized by the
Constitution to remedy a national problem.
In contrast, in City of Richmond v JA. Croson Co.,49 the
Supreme Court struck down the City of Richmond's thirty-percent set
aside partly on the ground that the City, unlike Congress, did not have
"a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the
Fourteenth Amendment."" This is not to say that the City was
foreclosed from ever enacting race conscious measures. The Court
acknowledged that the City need not become a "passive participant in
a system of racial exclusion."5' Specifically, the Court explained that
as "a matter of state law, the city of Richmond has legislative authority
over its procurement policies, and can use its spending power to
remedy private discrimination, if it identifies that discrimination with
the particularity required by the Fourteenth Amendment."52 The point
48. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472-73. The Court went on to state:
Here we deal, as we noted earlier, not with the limited remedial powers of a federal
court, for example, but with the broad remedial powers of Congress. It is
fundamental that in no organ of government, state or federal, does there repose a
more comprehensive remedial power than in Congress, expressly charged by the
Constitution with competence and authority to enforce equal protection guarantees.
Id at 483; see also id. at 499 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The history of this Court's review of
congressional action demonstrates beyond question that the National Legislature is competent
to find constitutional and statutory violations. Unlike the Regents of the University of
California, Congress properly may-and must-address directly the problems of
discrimination in our society.").
49. 488 U.S. 469(1989).
50. Id. at 470 ("That Congress may identify and redress the effects of society wide
discrimination does not mean that, a fortiori, the States and their political subdivisions are
free to decide that such remedies are appropriate.").
51. Id. at 492.
52. Id.
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is not that the State is not authorized to ever take race into account;
recall the reference to a "passive participant." However, because we
trust states less and have codified our level of trust in section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, we cannot allow them the type of latitude that
Congress was allowed in Fullilove. Thus, even though epistemic
authority is discussed as a federalism/supremacy concern--drawing
the appropriate line between congressional and state authority in
formal doctrinal terms-what the decision boils down to is the
inability to trust states53 and the inability to trust black people with
political power."
From the perspective of epistemic authority, we can now make
sense of Justice O'Connor's deference to the University of Michigan
Law School." Moreover, Justice O'Connor's exercise of epistemic
deference is not without historical precedent. Various members of the
Court have explained that colleges and their regents must be accorded
leeway in devising admission plans tailored to the established mission
of their particular institution. 6 Some respond to this position with the
53. Id. at 490. The Court stated:
That Congress may identify and redress the effects of society-wide discrimination
does not mean that, a fortiori, the States and their political subdivisions are free to
decide that such remedies are appropriate. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
is an explicit constraint on state power, and the States must undertake any remedial
efforts in accordance with that provision. To hold otherwise would be to cede
control over the content of the Equal Protection Clause to the 50 state legislatures
and their myriad political subdivisions. The mere recitation of a benign or
compensatory purpose for the use of a racial classification would essentially entitle
the States to exercise the full power of Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and insulate any racial classification from judicial scrutiny under § 1.
Id.
54. Id. at 495-96 ("In this case, blacks constitute approximately 50% of the
population of the city of Richmond. Five of the nine seats on the city council are held by
blacks. The concern that a political majority will more easily act to disadvantage of a
minority based on unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts would seem to militate for,
not against, the application of heightened judicial scrutiny in this case.").
55. 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339 (2003) ("The Law School's educational judgment that such
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.").
56. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 404 (1978) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Programs of admissions to institutions of higher learning are basically a
responsibility for academicians and for administrators and the specialists they
employ. The judiciary, in contrast, is ill-equipped and poorly trained for this. The
administration and management of educational institutions are beyond the
competence of judges and are within the special competence of educators,
provided always that the educators perform within legal and constitutional bounds.
For me, therefore, interference by the judiciary must be the rare exception, not the
rule.
2018
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criticism that it invites, perhaps welcomes, all kinds of invidiously
discriminatory practices. Others argue that the Court should only be
concerned with invidious distinctions." Justice O'Connor's outlook is
that the "good faith" of university officials must be "presumed" unless
one has reason to believe otherwise. 8
Justice Powell also articulated a second concern. Assuming that a
defensible and/or "arbitrary" line could be drawn, Justice Powell
worried that the Court is not competent to adequately reflect the
changing social and political realities. That is, as certain groups
gained political power and social standing, such that they were no
longer subject to societal discrimination or its effects, "new judicial
rankings would be necessary." As the Court explained, the "kind of
variable sociological and political analysis necessary to produce such
rankings simply does not lie within the judicial competence-even if
Id.; see also DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 329, 344 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that "educators must be given leeway" in devising admission
processes for their institutions). Justice Douglas further noted: "The educational policy
choices confronting a university admissions committee are not ordinarily a subject for
judicial oversight."
Similarly, Christopher Edley asserts, and I recognize, that "[t]he value-intensive choices
[involved in the affirmative action debate] are tough ones." CHRISTOIHER EDLEY, Nor ALL
BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE, AND AMERICAN VALUES 204 (1996). Edley
also asks, upon his recognition that "affirmative action needs a lot of discretion," whether we
can "trust all those organizations and people with that kind of discretion, given the moral
costs of error?" Id; see also Nathan Glazer, In Defense of Preference, NEW REPUBLIC 18, 24-
5 (April 6, 1998) ("[W]e have always left room for a large degree of freedom for institutions
of higher education, public as well as private, to admit students based on academic criteria...
. Let us preserve this institutional autonomy."); Amy Gutmann, Responding to Racial
Injustice, in K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL
MORALITY OF RACE 106, 129 (1996) (explaining that while the set of proper qualifications for
a given position is open ended, "boundaries [exist] beyond which it would be unreasonable to
claim that someone is basically qualified to be admitted as a student to a selective university
or hired as a high school teacher" and that inside these loosely delineated boundaries "a
range of discretion may be legitimately exercised"). To Edley's admission, Professor Deborah
Malamud responds with a question of her own: "Is that not a good argument for vigorous
judicial review, lest we leave the decisions in the hands of the 'tens of thousands of decision-
makers in corporations and colleges and governments' who will otherwise be in charge?"
Deborah C. Malamud, Values, Symbols, and Facts in the Affirmative Action Debate, 95
MICH. L. REv. 1668, 1685 n.38 (1997) (book review).
57. See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 344 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Courts are not
educators; their expertise is limited; and our task ends with the inquiry whether, judged by the
main purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, -- the protection against racial discrimination -
there has been an 'invidious' discrimination."); Cedric Merlin Powell, BlindedBy Color. The
New Equal Protection, The Second Deconstruction, andAffirmative Inaction, 51 U. MIAMI L.
RE. 191, 198 (1997) (arguing that constitutional racial discriminations must be distinguished
from unconstitutional ones on the basis of racial animus).
58. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
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they otherwise were politically feasible and socially desirable."59
Consequently, "the mutability of [the] constitutional principle, based
upon shifting political and social judgments, undermines the chances
for consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to
the next, a critical feature of its coherent interpretation."
Such a preoccupation with appropriate line drawing is important
to the conception of freedom or liberty, and thus implicates liberal
theory as well. John Rawls, among others, argues that justice, at least
formal justice, necessitates the "impartial and consistent
administration of laws and institutions, whatever their substantive
principles."' He notes that a
legal system is a coercive order of public rules addressed to rational
persons for the purpose of regulating their conduct and providing the
framework for social cooperation. When these rules are just they
establish a basis for legitimate expectations. They constitute grounds
upon which persons can rely on one another and rightly object when
their expectations are not fulfilled. If the bases of these claims are
unsure, so are the boundaries of men's liberties."
Ronald Dworkin makes a similar argument. 3 For Dworkin, the
preoccupation with appropriate line drawing is based upon the related
concern of fairness, as opposed to strictly justice." Fairness demands
that like cases are to be treated alike.65 The debate is, therefore, over
the proper criterion for classifying cases as "alike" and "dissimilar."
Dworkin argues that cases must be grouped together when they
implicate the same principles.66 To facilitate the fair (Dworkin), just
(Rawls), and/or equal (Bakke) adjudication of later cases, the judicial
59. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297.
60. Id at 298.
61. JoHN RAWLS,A THEORY OF JUSTICE 58 (1971).
62. Id at 235.
63. RONALDDWORKIN,TAKINGRIGHTSSERIOUSLY 113-16(1997).
64. Id at 113 ("The gravitational force of a precedent may be explained by appeal,
not to the wisdom of enforcing enactments, but to the fairness of treating like cases alike.").
65. This same argument can be made from the concern with equality, in addition to
concerns with justice and fairness. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90 ("The guarantee of equal
protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when
applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is
not equal.").
66. DwoRKiN, supra note 63, at 113 ("Hercules will conclude that this doctrine of
fairness offers the only adequate account of the full practice of precedent. He will draw
certain further conclusions about his own responsibilities when deciding hard cases. The
most important of these is that he must limit the gravitational force of earlier decisions to the
extension of the arguments of principle necessary to justify those decisions.").
2020 [Vol. 78:2009
HeinOnline  -- 78 Tul. L. Rev. 2020 2003-2004
2004] AFFIRMA TIVE A CTIONAND COLORBLINDNESS 2021
task, in this context, is to articulate principlcd distinctions that
necessitate a decision in favor of one party and against another.
It is precisely the force of this point that persuaded Justice Powell
in Bakke that a "two-class theory" of equal protection was indefensible
on principled grounds.7 Thus, Justice Powell concluded that it would
be better to promulgate "a reading of the Equal Protection Clause that
states a principle of universal application and is responsive to the
racial, ethnic, and cultural diversity of the Nation6 8 than one that
attempts to distinguish between the various claims of respective racial
groups. This conclusion follows from the Court's lack of confidence
in its ability to adequately perform that task. This principle of
"universal application," we know well, is that all racial classifications
are suspect, irrespective of the underlying motivations for their
enactments. This principle of universal application deprives the Court
of the concomitant necessity of engaging in an exercise of comparative
harm impairment. All the while, at least in theory, a principle of
universal application enables the Court to evaluate legitimate uses of
race from illegitimate ones.
The inability to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
applications of race is forcefully articulated by Justice O'Connor in
Croson.9 Justice O'Connor stated:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for ... race-
based measures, there is simply no way of determining what
classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what classifications are
in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple
67. Justice Powell noted:
The reservation of a proportion of the law school class for members of selected
minority groups is fraught with ... dangers, for one must immediately determine
which groups are to receive such favored treatment and which are to be excluded,
the proportions of the class that are to be allocated to each, and even the criteria by
which to determine whether an individual is a member of a favored group. There
is no assurance that a common agreement can be reached, and first the schools, and
then the courts, will be buffeted with the competing claims. The University of
Washington included Filipinos, but excluded Chinese and Japanese; another school
may limit its program to blacks, or to blacks and Chicanos. Once the Court
sanctioned racial preferences such as these, it could not then wash its hands of the
matter, leaving it entirely in the discretion of the school, for then we would have
effectively overruled Sweatt v Painter and allowed imposition of a 'zero'
allocation. But what standard is the Court to apply when a rejected applicant of
Japanese ancestry brings suit to require the University of Washington to extend the
same privileges to his group?
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297 (quoting DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 337-38 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)) (internal citations omitted).
68. Id. at 293.
69. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
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racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out"
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing
a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.7°
Moreover, affirmative action programs may produce negative
externalities or undesirable social costs. For example, they may
"engender[] attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke[]
resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged by
the government's use of race."7' They may also lower the incentive for
their intended beneficiaries to achieve on their own merits.72 Or, they
may serve to "reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain
groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based
on a factor having no relationship to individual worth."3
If the Court is incompetent to distinguish illicit from licit motives
but insists on the justiciability of affirmative action claims,
colorblindness in state decision making can be the only alternative.
Moreover, given the fact that all racial classifications are suspect-
especially because they are more often than not motivated by
unconstitutional considerations-and the difficulty of distinguishing
between legitimate and illegitimate motives, it is not incomprehensible
that strict scrutiny would and did lead to fatal scrutiny.
Hence, the actions complained of in Sweatt v Paintel4  and
Hopwood v Texa?' are constitutionally suspect because they may have
been motivated by illicit purposes. By lumping both cases into the
same broad category, an affirmative action remedy to facilitate the
legal education of people of color is classified on the same moral plane
as a plan that categorically denied admission to any person of color.
70. Id.
71. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2362 (Thomas J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240
(1995) (Thomas J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
72. Id at 2364 (Thomas J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("As admission
prospects [for black applicants] approach certainty, there is no incentive for the black
applicant to continue to prepare for the LSAT once he is reasonably assured of achieving the
requisite score.").
73. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
74. 339 U.S. 629, 634-35 (1950). In Sweat, Heman Marion Sweatt challenged a
statute of the State of Texas restricting admission to the University of Texas Law School to
white students. Id. at 631. In response to the challenge, the State of Texas created a new law
school for black students. Id. at 633. Applying the doctrine of Plessy v Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896), the Supreme Court held that Mr. Sweatt was entitled to admission at the
University of Texas Law School because the new law school-the School of the Texas State
University for Negroes-was not substantially equal to Texas's flagship law school. Sweatt
339 U.S. at 633-34.
75. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F3d 932, 939-40 (5th Cir. 1996).
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From this perspective, colorblindness as a constitutional principle
is a moral imperative. This moral imperative is derived from the
propositions that the individual is the proper unit of constitutional
analysis; that the Court and the state are more often than not unable to
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate uses of race; and that
even where the state may believe that it is acting in the best interest of
citizens of color, the state's action may be in fact harmful to intended
beneficiaries or produce negative externalities.
In the remainder of this Essay, I evaluate whether colorblindess is
a moral imperative. I do so against the backdrop of classical liberalism
and in particular from a Rawlsian perspective.7
III. RAWLS AND JUSTICE
The primary purpose of John Rawls's theory of justice is to
"provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions
of society and [to] define the appropriate distribution of the benefits
and burdens of social cooperation."77 Rawls's theory of justice presents
a set of principles whose purpose is to provide a method for "choosing
among the various social arrangements which determine [the] division
of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper
distributive shares."78
Rawls's first basic assumption is that even though we may all
have different conceptions of justice, we all share the same concept of
justice.79 Our shared concept of justice is that institutions should not
make arbitrary distinctions between individuals." In addition,
institutions must strike a "proper balance" between competing claims
in distributing the bounty of social resources that is the product of
social cooperation."' We agree on a particular conception of justice
when we share the same understanding about how benefits and
burdens are to be distributed in society.
At first glance, Rawls's theory appears to be profoundly
individualistic. He notes that "[e]ach person possesses an inviolability
founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot
override."82  Justice, Rawls instructs us, does not allow the few to
76. See generallyRAwLs, supm note 61.
77. Id at4.
78. Id.
79. See id at 11.
80. Seeid. at 3-4.
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id at 3.
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subsidize the welfare of the many.83 Consequently, Rawls's theory is a
very rights-oriented theory. Individuals possess certain basic political
rights that cannot be curtailed .
However, Rawls's theory is not completely individualistic. Rawls
maintains that although "justice as fairness begins by taking the
persons in the original position as individuals, or more accurately as
continuing strands, this is no obstacle to explicating the higher-order
moral sentiments that serve to bind a community of persons
together."85 Rawls notes that the "primary subject of the principles of
social justice is the basic structure of society, the arrangement of major
social institutions into one scheme of cooperation."" Thus, it is social
institutions that are the aim of the principles ofjustice.
For Rawls, the task is to determine the rules and principles that
are to govern the interaction between individuals (or representative
persons) and social institutions.8 These rules, or principles of justice,
are determined from the original position of equality. In the
hypothetical original position of equality, free and rational human
beings pursuing their individual ends in cooperation with one another
establish the principles that will govern "the fundamental terms of their
association."9
Rawls posits two principles that would have been chosen in the
original position:
83. See id at 3-4.
84. See id
85. Id. at 192. As Rawls notes,
The point is rather that the persons in the original position are not to view
themselves as single isolated individuals. To the contrary, they assume that they
have interests which they must protect as best they can and that they have ties with
certain members of the next generation who will also make similar claims.
Id. at 206.
86. Id. at 54.
87. Rawls defines an institution as
a public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and
duties, powers and immunities, and the like. These rules specify certain forms of
action as permissible, others as forbidden; and they provide for certain penalties
and defenses, and so on, when violations occur. As examples of institutions, or
more generally social practices, we may think of games and rituals, trials and
parliaments, markets and systems of property.
Id. at 55.
88. See id at 54.
89. See id. at 60.
90. Id at 11.
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First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
basic liberty9' compatible with a similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and
(b) attached to positions and offices open to all.92
The first principle, the liberties of equal citizenship principle, applies
to the assignment of rights and duties. The second principle correlates
with the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social
cooperation.
In Rawls's theory, institutions cannot differentiate among
individuals with regard to political liberties, what he terms the liberties
of equal citizenship.93 "These liberties are all required to be equal by
the first principle, since citizens of a just society are to have the same
basic rights." Moreover, greater socioeconomic equalities can never
compensate for political inequality.5 By the promulgation of the
second principle, the equal opportunity principle, Rawls acknowledges
the reality of inequalities in wealth, income distribution, etc.96
However, Rawls attempts to cabin those inequalities by the restriction
that inequalities must be to everyone's benefit and that institutional
offices must be open to all.
The justification for the principles of equal citizenship and equal
opportunity is that these are the principles that rational, self-interested
individuals would agree upon in the original position as they set about
attempting to pursue their respective ends. The original position
performs the same function for Rawls as the concept of autonomy in
91. Rawls defines basic liberties as
political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with
freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought;
freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and
freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of
law.
Id at 61.
92. Id. at 60-61.
93. Id. at 63-64.
94. Id at 61. Rawls does allow for a possible exception. He notes that the "only
reason for circumscribing the rights defining liberty and making men's freedom less
extensive than it might otherwise be is that these equal rights as institutionally defined would
interfere with one another." Id. at 64.
95. Id. at 63 (noting that the serial ordering of the two principles of equal citizenship
and equal opportunity "does not permit exchanges between basic liberties and economic and
social gains").
96. See id.
97. See id. at 92.
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classical liberalism.98 Rawls reasons that even though the concept of a
society implies a cooperative venture, because human beings are self-
interested individuals, principles are necessary for determining how to
distribute the actualized benefits of mutual cooperation. The
functional purpose of the original position is to reason from a set of
circumstances that will provide a fair procedure "so that any principles
agreed to will be just."99 Rawls maintains that to "say that a certain
conception of justice would be chosen in the original position is
equivalent to saying that rational deliberation satisfying certain
conditions and restrictions would reach a certain conclusion."'
One of the conditions of the original position is the veil of
ignorance.' °1 The purpose of the veil of ignorance is to prevent
individuals in the original position from choosing principles that will
serve their particular situations.' 2 This would be contrary to Rawls's
purpose, which is to deduce the most just principles.' 3 In order to
fulfill that goal, individuals in the original position "must choose
principles the consequences of which they are prepared to live with
whatever" their lot in life.'" Thus, in the original position:
[N]o one knows his place in society, his class position or social status;
nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and
abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does
anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars of his rational
plan of life, or even the special features of his psychology such as his
aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism. More than this
... the parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own
society. That is, they do no know its economic or political situation, or
the level of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve.'
98. Id at 516:
Both autonomy and objectivity are characterized in a consistent way by reference
to the original position. The idea of the initial situation is central to the whole
theory and other basic notions are defined in terms of it. Thus acting
autonomously is acting from principles that we would consent to as free and equal
rational beings, and that we are to understand in this way.
99. Id. at 136.
100. Id at 138.
101. Seeidat 13642.
102. Seeid at 136-37.
103. Rawls states, "It must make no difference when one takes up this viewpoint, or
who does so: the restrictions must be such that the same principles are always chosen." Id. at
139; see also id. at 140 ("The veil of ignorance makes possible a unanimous choice of a
particular conception of justice.").
104. Seeid at 137.
105. Id.
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In addition to the veil of ignorance, there are other constraints
imposed upon persons in the original position. First, persons in the
original position can only adopt general principles.' 6 That is, the
adoption of a principle of justice is not contingent upon the
circumstances of a particular person or group of persons. Second, the
principles chosen in the original position must be applied universally.1
7
Third, the principles must be public. Fourth, the principles must be
capable of preferencing competing claims.'0 This seems to be a
requirement that claims be adjudicated on the basis of the principles of
justice as fairness. Last, a solution of competing claims deduced from
the principles of justice as fairness is final.' 9 "They override the
demands of law and custom, and of social rules generally."' 10
The cumulative effect of Rawls's framework is to provide us with
a mechanism for the creation of just principles, rules, and policies.
Rawls promises us principles that apply to the basic structure of
society. It is precisely for these reasons that Rawls framework is
particularly i propos for analyzing the claims of affirmative action
opponents. Their claim is that race consciousness violates a
fundamental understanding of equality and justice. Rawls provides us
with a mechanism for evaluating that claim.
IV EVALUATING COLORBLINDNESS FROM THE ORIGINAL POSITION
Recall that in the original position "no one knows his place in
society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his
fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his
intelligence, strength, and the like."'" Importantly, individuals in the
original position are also not aware of their race, although we can
reasonably assume that they are a racially diverse lot."2 Recall also
that representative persons in the original position would agree first on
the principle of equal liberty.' That is, "each person [would] have an
equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a
106. Seeid at 131.
107. Seeid at 132.
108. Seeid at 133.
109. See id at 133-34.
110. Id. at 135.
111. Idat12.
112. See id. at 126-30; see also id. at 221 ("Justice as fairness begins with the idea that
where common principles are necessary and to everyone's advantage, they are to be worked
out from the viewpoint of a suitably defined initial situation of equality in which each person
is fairly represented").
113. Id at 244 ("The two principles are in lexical order, and therefore the claims of
liberty are to be satisfied first. Until this is achieved no other principle comes into play.").
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similar liberty for others.""' Our first inquiry is whether colorblind-
ness is necessitated by the principle of equal liberty. If it is, then we
need to inquire whether the infringement can be justified. If it is not,
then we can move on to the second principle.
There are two senses in which representative persons in the
original position can understand colorblindness. Here we draw again
on our understanding of epistemic authority to distinguish between
how representative persons would understand the command to
colorblindness in the original position. I will term these two
understandings, respectively, colorblindness as social condition and
colorblindness as official condition. First, they could understand the
command to colorblindness as an ascriptive social condition. That is,
colorblindness is a requirement that race not have any place in any
arena of institutional social arrangements; this includes all
institutions."5  This is the broad command to colorblindness that
encompasses and blurs the line between private and public distinctions.
Second, they can understand colorblindness as simply proscribing race
as a precluded justificatory category for state decision making. In this
sense, all that is meant by colorblindness is that the state can never use
race as a justification for a decision because race is an excluded
category. Private individuals, however, are free to behave, within
limits, according to the dictates of their conscience.
From Rawls's perspective, representative persons in the original
position would not choose the understanding of colorblindness implied
in the first sense because persons in the original position, all things
being equal, would maximize the extent of their liberty."6 In other
words, the default assumption of persons in the original position is to
greater autonomy and greater liberty. As Rawls makes clear, the only
permissible limit on liberty is the extent to which more liberty
jeopardizes liberty itself. 7  Given then that excluding race as a
justification for socioinstitutional purposes is a restriction on liberty,
that decision must be justified by efforts to secure "the total system of
liberty shared by all.""8
114. Id.at60-61.
115. Rawls defines institutions as "a public system of rules which defines offices and
positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like. These rules
specify certain forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden; and they provide for
certain penalties and defenses, and so on, when violations occur." Id. at 55.
116. Seeid at60.
117. Id. at 244 (stating that "the precedence of liberty means that liberty can be
restricted only for the sake of liberty itself").
118. Idat250.
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There are two ways in which liberty can be limited. "The basic
liberties may either be less extensive though still equal, or they may be
unequal.""' 9 Colorblindness as social condition falls under the first
category, less extensive but equal liberty. To justify the adoption of
colorblindness as a social condition, persons in the original position
would have to conclude that this restriction of their autonomy, on
balance, actually strengthens their autonomy.
Here, then, it is necessary to examine the claims of the
proponents of colorblindness and to attempt to understand the nature
of the harms that colorblindness attempts to avoid in an ideal or well-
ordered society under favorable circumstances. What are the
arguments that would be advanced by the proponents of colorblindness
in the original position? There are three such arguments.
The first argument is that everyone must have the right to be
treated as individuals, yet taking race into account when making
decisions undermines that right. A second and related argument is that
only relevant characteristics about individuals should be taken into
account, and, given that race is always an irrelevant characteristic, it
should never be taken into account. The third argument is that race
consciousness leads to racism (which will have to be defined), and,
given that all individuals in the original position would want to avoid
racism, race should not be taken into account. I will deal with these
arguments in seriatim, starting with the proposition that race
consciousness is inconsistent with a system of individual rights.
The proposition that persons must be treated as individuals is
incoherent as a practical matter and would not be chosen by persons in
the original position for two reasons. First, such a broad proposition
would preclude any decisions from being made at all. Second, the
principle of equal citizenship can only be coherently understood if it
means individuals will not be treated qua individuals but as equal
members of a cooperative society. To treat equally means to treat the
same. If we are to treat people as individuals, given that no two people
are alike, we cannot at the same time treat them as if they are the same.
Suppose that we are attempting to devise rules in the original
position for admitting persons to law schools. Suppose that a member
of our council proposes as a neutral decision-making principle the
proposition that law schools ought to admit people only on the basis of
individual merit, not because they belong to particular groups or
categories.
119. Id. at 244.
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The immediate dilemma that would be faced by our
administrators is to determine what it means to treat a person as an
individual. Does it mean that all of the characteristics of the individual
must be taken into account before a decision about that individual can
be made? Does it mean that certain salient characteristics of the
individual cannot be given more weight than other characteristics? To
further extend our hypothetical scenario, would the law school be
forbidden to consider the fact that Applicant X is a member of the
group that scored in the ninety-ninth percentile on her LSATs? Or
from Region 1? Or the daughter of an alumnus?
How do rational, self-interested individuals (and institutions)
make decisions in the process of furthering their ends? When making
decisions, individuals and institutions are looking for salient
characteristics that some individuals possess and others do not.
Indeed, the process of deciding involves precisely the type of
categorization (e.g., Northeasterner, smart, high LSAT scorer) that the
council's rule would purport to prohibit. The command to treat
everyone as individuals would preclude institutions and people from
making any judgments whatsoever about others.
The proposition that race consciousness is inconsistent with the
principle that individuals are to be treated qua individuals and not as
members of particular groups is itself inconsistent with how we
presume that rational, self-interested individuals make distinctions
among things or people in the process of furthering their goals.
Sometimes we want to choose people for certain rewards because they
possess salient characteristics that fit our decisional criteria. For
example, I want to marry a smart, tall, beautiful, Jewish woman. Or, I
only want to admit smart people to my school. Or, I only want hard
workers in my factory. Or, I want to live in a predominantly or
exclusively black neighborhood; I want to live in this neighborhood
not because I do not like people of other races, but because I have a
strong sense of self-identity and self-respect when I am surrounded by
black people. I may not want any blacks in my restaurant. I do not
want any blacks in my house. I only want tall people on my team, and
so on. When I choose a person because they are tall, black, Jewish,
smart, beautiful, nice, etc., I am not treating them "as individuals."
That is, I am picking a characteristic that they possess that I find
salient, and I am making my decision on the basis of that
characteristic.
This is how rational people make decisions in the process of
furthering their ends. If it were not so, we would not be able to make
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distinctions among things or people. Persons in the original position
would not want to curtail their autonomy in this way because as
rational, self-interested individuals, they would want to be able to
make distinctions based upon salient characteristics that further their
ends. If institutions cannot make decisions on the basis of salient
characteristics (e.g., smart, talented, tall, etc.) then no decisions can
ever be made. The cost in individual autonomy would not be worth
whatever harms are thought to be averted by a rule postulating
individualism.
An argument based upon individualism is also incoherent on a
second plane. Rawls's equal citizenship principle states that "each
person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others.'"12 The equal citizenship
principle explicitly hinges individual equality upon group equality.
How do we know if a person is being treated unequally? We look at
the rest of society to see what rights everybody else has.
The following two examples will serve to prove the point.
Suppose the administrators at our law school decide to admit everyone
who scores above a 165 on the LSAT. Suppose John Xscored a 166
but was denied admission. His argument to equal treatment would not
be that he should be evaluated differently than everyone else. His
argument would be that he should be treated the same as the 165-and-
over club: he should be granted admission. Here an argument on the
basis of individuality does not make any sense. Indeed, it would be
odd for John Xto argue that he should be admitted on the basis that he
is John X To treat John Xas an individual does not tell us how John
Xis to be treated, except to say, "Do not treat me like the group that
does not deserve admission." What John Xwants is to be treated in
the same manner that people in his category, in his group, are being
treated.
Consider the harm principle in this context. Mill stated that "it
must by no means be supposed, because damage, or probability of
damage, to the interests of others, can alone justify the interference of
society, that therefore it always does justify such interference." '21 In
particular, "disappointed competitors" do not suffer "harm" such that
would justify interference with the goals of the successful
competitor.'22 The question of course is what counts as "harm." And
concomitantly, are all considerations of race harmful?
120. Id. at 60.
121. MILL, supM note 10, at 94.
122. Id. Mill states:
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To illustrate, suppose instead that our administrators decide that
blacks are stupid, and, therefore, they will not admit any blacks into the
law school. Suppose that John Y, who is black, is denied admission to
the law school. John Yargues that he should be granted admission on
the ground that he should be treated as an individual but not as a
member of a group. Perhaps this scenario more closely resembles the
typical argument against affirmative action. But it is no more coherent
than the example of John X, given above.
John Yand John Xare making the same argument: "Do not treat
me like the group that does not deserve admission." In the case of
John Ythe group is blacks, in the case of John Xthe group is the 164-
and-under club. In both cases the real issue is about whether the
individual meets the criterion for admission. John Ywould argue that
the real criterion for admission is smart people. He would further
argue that because he is a smart person, he should be granted
admission.
From this perspective, individual equality is either incoherent or
an oxymoron. Proponents of colorblindness as individualism often
pretend that what they mean when they say that people should be
treated as individuals is that every person should be evaluated against
herself But as I remarked above, if you ranked each person against
herself, it would be impossible to make any decisions: the criterion for
decision making would be each individual. But what they actually
mean is that Person Xis to be treated similarly as everyone else. At
the very least colorblindness as individualism does not provide us with
an accurate understanding of what it means to treat people equally. At
best, it is unhelpful.
Consequently, persons in the original position would eschew the
proposition that individuals are to be treated as individuals. Perhaps
they would find more persuasive the proposition that only relevant
criteria are to be taken into account, and, given that race is always an
Whoever succeeds in an overcrowded profession, or in a competitive examination;
whoever is preferred to another in any contest for an object which both desire,
reaps benefit from the loss of others, from their wasted exertion and their
disappointment. But is it, by common admission, better for the general interest of
mankind, that persons should pursue their objects undeterred by this sort of
consequences. In other words, society admits no right, either legal or moral, in the
disappointed competitors, to immunity from this kind of suffering; and feels called
on to interfere, only when means of success have been employed which if it is
contrary to the general interest to have been employed which it is contrary to the
general interest to permit-namely, fraud or treachery, and force.
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irrelevant criterion, colorblindness should be the standard of choice. It
is to this second argument that I now turn.
To better examine this claim, let us return to the case of John Y
John Y, an African-American, is being denied admission to the law
school because he is black. One argument available to John Yis that
race is an irrelevant criterion and should not be used as a standard for
deciding who to admit to the law school.
Although this proposition looks very powerful, upon closer
examination we will find that it can very easily be dismissed. To
dismiss this proposition we need to examine the question whether
individuals in the original position would always regard race as an
irrelevant criterion. For the reasons stated below, the answer is no.
First, we must remember the ahistorical perspective of the
original position. There, race is no more pernicious than any of the
individual's other physical characteristics, such as her height or the size
of her feet. Proponents of the proposition that race is an irrelevant
criterion would have to explain what it is that is harmful about race
such that excluding race as a category contributes to the liberty of all.
What is it that differentiates race from other arguably arbitrary
characteristics such as geography, legacy, playing musical instruments,
and socioeconomic background? The proposition that race is an
arbitrary characteristic does not clarify the harms caused by taking
race into account-if any-such that would compel persons in the
original position to choose to curtail their liberty. This proposition
makes sense only if one assumes that colorblindness is the appropriate
standard.
There is a second reason why persons in the original position
would not favor the proposition that race is an arbitrary criterion. This
is because persons in the original position value primary goods, '23
which are necessary for furthering basic liberties.'24 One important
primary good is self-respect."' There is an associational aspect to the
123. Primary goods are
things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants.
Regardless of what an individual's rational plans are in detail, it is assumed that
there are various things which he would prefer more of rather than less. With more
of these goods men can generally be assured of greater success in carrying out
their intentions and in advancing their ends, whatever these ends may be. The
primary social goods, to give them in broad categories, are rights and liberties,
opportunities and powers, income and wealth.
RAWLS, supm note 61, at 92; see also id at 62.
124. See id at 141-42, 144.
125. Id at 440-46 (stating that "the most important primary good is self-respect").
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concept of self-respect. Human beings, Rawls notes, have a basic
desire "to express their nature in a free social union with others."'26
What is the harm that can be identified when individuals use race
as a basis for decisions about the types of people with whom they will
associate, marry, befriend, live, etc.? Consider two alternatives: racial
animus and individualized burdens.
It seems to me that one of the things we worry about is racial
animus. Most people would agree that there is a difference between
the NAACP or the Jewish Community Center (JCC) or the Italian
Center (ICC) and David Duke's National Association for the
Advancement of White People. Most people would agree that the
NAACP is preferable to the NAAWP. The NAACP, the JCC, and the
ICC (and other similar race- or ethnicity-based associations) add
something to our self-identity and self-respect that we value and
treasure. The key is to identify what we value about the former and
what we fear with respect to the latter.
It is very obvious that what we fear is racism. This leads us to the
third argument, which is that race consciousness leads to racism. We
can also dismiss this argument with a simple analogy. Suppose that
proponents of colorblindness also argued that freedom of religion must
be abolished because religion consciousness leads to religious strife.
Once we reposition the problem in the context of freedom of religion
and conscience, we can follow and adopt Rawls's reasoning that people
in the original position would choose equal liberty of conscience. For
the same reasons that people in the original position would choose
liberty of conscience and religion, even though there exists the
possibility that religious pluralism can lead to religious strife, they
would also favor racial pluralism. The ability to define oneself
according to one's culture and race is in many important ways
synonymous with the ability to define oneself according to one's
religion, or lack thereof.
Fundamentally, the question is empirical. It may be the case that
affirmative action will return us to an era of Jim Crow racism. I doubt
that, but that is an empirical question that must be answered with
empirical facts.
Second, one may be concerned with the fact that affirmative
action imposes burdens upon innocent others. However, it is not clear
that the concern with burdens necessarily leads to the conclusion
preferred by opponents of affirmative action. As Justice Thomas
126. Id at 543.
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himself argued in Grutter, the University of Michigan Law School
chose "measures it knows produce racially skewed results."'
27
A concern with individual burdens does not lead to a neutral
baseline. Affirmative action may burden members of the nonpreferred
class. But the absence of affirmative action imposes a burden also on
those harmed by the state's nonracial classification. Moreover, just as
whites may become resentful of the state and of racial groups preferred
by affirmative action as a result of affirmative action, African-
Americans and Latinos may become distrustful and resentful of the
state if they continue to suffer disproportionately.'28 Thus, questions of
justice are presented on both sides of the equation.
What would persons in the original position do? Here lies the
beauty of the Court's resolution in Grutter. Though one may disagree
with the application of the Court's resolution, the Court's insistence
that diversity is a broad concept that is open to all is fairly compelling.
Diversity includes not only racial diversity but geographic diversity,
intellectual diversity, etc. Moreover, everyone can argue individually
how they would contribute to the diversity of the institution. Each
applicant, as a matter of justice, is provided with an opportunity of
meeting the relevant criteria. This seems to be a more helpful method
of conceptualizing and operationalizing the notion of individualized
consideration.
V CONCLUSION
What we have from the Court in Grutter is an attempt to walk a
middle line on an issue where there are comparative merits on both
sides. Inevitably, the Court will be criticized on both the right and the
left. But I think those criticisms are misplaced.
As citizens of a polity, why should citizens of color bear the brunt
of a state's public policy decisions? What would we chose in the
original position? My guess is that we would choose a method that
more or less resembles the Court's decision in Grutter People of color
have a right to have their considerations taken into account. By the
same token, the Court attempted to spread the burdens and benefits of
affirmative action as broadly as possible. The Court's decision may
127. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2361 (2003) (Thomas J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
128. See, e.g., id. at 2340 ("In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the
eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.").
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not be perfectly just, but it is probably as close as one will get outside
of the original position.
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